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Abstract
The study investigated the relation of religious fundamentalism (RF) and prejudice in the
presence of two threat conditions: epistemic uncertainty, introduced via threat to beliefs,
and existential threat, presented through mortality salience induction. A model of RF as a
belief system adopted to manage uncertainty and threat was also presented. Participants
were 396 undergraduates, 192 of whom met inclusion requirements. RF was significantly
related to prejudice toward women, toward homosexual individuals, and toward other
religions, the latter relationship being strongest. No significant effects for threat condition
were found. Results indicate that the uncertainty and/or threat introduced by the target
groups varied in magnitude and that this uncertainty and/or threat was stronger than that
posed by the threat conditions.
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The Effects of Religious Fundamentalism and Threat on Prejudice
The term, fundamentalism, was initially coined in the United States in 1910 in a
series of articles entitled, The Fundamentals (Gatewood, 1969; Johnstone, 1997). The
Fundamentals consisted of nine principles created by Protestant religious leaders in the
United States in response to modernism, liberalism, and secularism, which advocated a
return to the basics of Christian faith (Gatewood, 1969; Johnstone, 1997; Sim, 2004). The
term fundamentalism began as pertaining solely to Christianity, though it has since been
applied to other faiths that also call for a “return to the basics” within their religions (e.g.
Fundamentalist Orthodox Jews, Islamic Fundamentalists) (Johnstone, 1997). Globally,
fundamentalism gained initial notice during the Iran Hostage Crisis of 1979-1980 (Chafe,
1999). Since that time, fundamentalism has continued to spread throughout the world.
Globalization and the opposition to it have influenced the worldwide expansion of
fundamentalism. As traditional cultures are disrupted, displaced, and endangered by the
forces of globalization, including modernism, liberalism, and secularism, these cultures
muster resistance to the accompanying uncertainty and sense of threat; unfortunately, all
too often this struggle has taken violent form (Salzman, 2008). Because religious
fundamentalism comes with perilous implications, understanding the psychology of
fundamentalism is vital.
Despite their theological differences, fundamentalists of most religions are
typified by three beliefs: (a) they (and others) must return to the basics of the true faith;
(b) there is one standard of truth (e.g. the Bible, the Torah, or the Quran), which is
contested by evil; and (c) believers have a special relationship with God, which includes
doing God’s work on Earth so that they may live in the hereafter (Altemeyer &
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Hunsberger, 1992; Johnstone, 1997). Fundamentalists of different religions also share
similar attitudes and behaviors, including a consistent association with prejudice and
discrimination (Altemeyer, 2003; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992, 1993; Fulton,
Gorsuch, & Maynard, 1999; Hunsberger, 1995, 1996; Hunsberger, Owusu, & Duck,
1999; Kirkpatrick, 1993; McFarland, 1989).
Religious Fundamentalism and Prejudice
Most religions contain teachings that advocate treating one’s neighbors with
loving kindness. Yet, early researchers found that being religious was associated with
prejudice and began to examine this phenomenon more fully (see e.g., Batson, 1976 or
Batson, Floyd, Meyer, & Winner, 1999). As different facets and orientations of religion
were explored for their contributions to prejudice, fundamentalism began to be
investigated (see e.g., Kirkpatrick, 1993, McFarland, 1989, or Altemeyer & Hunsberger,
1992). Religious fundamentalism has been shown to be correlated with various
prejudices, including that toward women, homosexual individuals, and individuals of
other religious faiths (Altemeyer, 2003; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992, 1993; Fulton et
al., 1999; Hunsberger, 1995, 1996; Hunsberger et al., 1999; Kirkpatrick, 1993;
McFarland, 1989).
Women
As women are approximately one-half of the world’s population, prejudice
toward them has both global and personal, daily consequence; being viewed as less than
equal sanctions disrespect and maltreatment. Nevertheless, religious fundamentalism has
been repeatedly associated with sexist attitudes and discriminatory behavior toward
women. Two early studies on religious fundamentalism and prejudice investigated
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specifically the desire to discriminate against women and to restrict women’s roles in
society and the family based on sex. The first study, using Caucasian Christian
undergraduate participants from the United States and a six-item Christian specific
measurement of religious fundamentalism, found religious fundamentalism was
positively and significantly correlated with prejudice toward women (McFarland, 1989).
The second study was a near replication of the first, except the participants included
undergraduates from the United States and Canada of both Christian and non-Christian
affiliations, though because the same six-item measurement of religious fundamentalism
was used, the non-Christians were relegated automatically to non-fundamentalist status
neglecting that they may have been high in fundamentalism in their own religions.
Results indicated religious fundamentalism was again significantly associated with
prejudice against women (Kirkpatrick, 1993), although the strength of the correlation was
greatly diminished from that found in the previous study, which may have been due to the
methodological difficulties mentioned.
These two early studies suggested that Biblical literalism could explain the
prejudice toward women, as the Bible relegates women to a subservient status to men,
(McFarland, 1989; Kirkpatrick, 1993). Yet, religious beliefs also encourage compassion
towards others and do not seem to explain adequately of their own accord why prejudice
toward women is tolerable. The researchers further conjectured that fundamentalism
might be a way of knowing composed of a closed-mindedness that spills over into the
attitudes of those high in fundamentalism. Closed-mindedness may begin to explain some
facets of the relationship with prejudice toward women, but does not offer an explanation
as to what it is about closed-mindedness or women that results in persons high in
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fundamentalism exhibiting this prejudice.
A later study examined fundamentalism and sexist attitudes toward women,
including advocating more traditional behaviors and roles for women, in religions other
than Christianity, as well as in Christianity and Islam in another country (Hunsberger et
al., 1999). This study employed Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s (1992) Religious
Fundamentalism Scale, which measures fundamentalism based upon the manner in which
persons hold their religious beliefs, not on the specific content of those beliefs. For
example, one item states, “To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the
one, true religion” (p. 131), which applies equally well to Christianity or other religions.
Participants included Christian and Muslim university students from Ghana, along with
Christian and non-Christian university students from Canada (Hunsberger et al., 1999).
Religious fundamentalism was significantly correlated with prejudice toward women for
the Ghanaian Muslims and Canadian Christians, but not for the Ghanaian Christians. The
researchers speculated that the more traditional culture of Ghana would be associated
with greater prejudice toward women and were unsure if differences in belief content or
some other factor, such as cultural differences in interpretation of the measurement
questions, impacted the latter result (Hunsberger et al., 1999). No explanation was
provided to address why fundamentalism and prejudice toward women should be related.
Nevertheless, these results demonstrated that the relationship between religious
fundamentalism and prejudice toward women held across religions and cultures.
Beyond simply attitudes toward women, in an examination of religious
fundamentalism and discriminatory behavior, Canadian undergraduates from a variety of
religious and non-religious backgrounds were requested to list values that were important
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to them and to rate the extent to which target groups, in this case single mothers and
college students, threatened or promoted these values (Jackson & Esses, 1997).
Participants then read vignettes that explained that unemployment was high among
members of the target groups. The participants next rated the extent to which the
members of the target groups were responsible for the unemployment problem and chose
from among three types of help they would endorse for the target groups. The three
categories of helping included: (a) personal change, which advocated that the
unemployed individuals alter themselves and their behaviors to resolve the situation; (b)
direct assistance, which called for aid to be given through such acts as provision of
employment or monetary gifts; and (c) empowerment, which consisted of help through
job incentive and education programs (Jackson & Esses, 1997).
Results indicated religious fundamentalism was significantly correlated with
perceived value threat from single mothers, but not from students (Jackson & Esses,
1997). Also, for those high in religious fundamentalism, perceived value threat mediated
attributions of responsibility such that single mothers were held responsible for their
unemployment, but college students were not. Finally, individuals high in religious
fundamentalism endorsed personal change for the single mothers as the best manner in
which to help them with their employment difficulties, rejecting both the direct assistance
and empowerment forms of helping for them. Religious fundamentalism was not
associated with sanctioning any particular type of help over the others for college
students. These results suggest that for those high in religious fundamentalism, perceived
threats to their values impacts the determination of whom they are willing to help and the
type of help they are willing to provide (Jackson & Esses, 1997). As an explanation,

Fundamentalism and threat

9

value-threat offers the beginnings of a basis for understanding why religious
fundamentalism and prejudice toward women are related. Perhaps, feminism and single
mothers are threats to the beliefs and values of persons high in religious fundamentalism;
however, value-threat is neither a comprehensive nor a nuanced theory of religious
fundamentalism. A group of persons is said to be value-threatening and no further
psychological processes are considered or predictions for further research generated.
Taken together, the literature suggests religious fundamentalism is associated with
prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behavior toward women across broad participant
samples, including individuals from three countries and several religions. Yet, the
literature provides only a few possible reasons for the relationship between religious
fundamentalism and prejudice toward women, Biblical literalism, closed-mindedness,
and value-threat, none of which is adequate as a theory of fundamentalism.
Homosexual Individuals
In addition to women and single mothers, fundamentalism has regularly been
associated with prejudice toward homosexual individuals (Altemeyer, 2003; Altemeyer &
Hunsberger, 1992; Fulton et al., 1999; Hunsberger, 1996; Hunsberger et al., 1999;
Kirkpatrick, 1993; McFarland, 1989). Once more, being viewed as a less valued member
of society implies that unfair and unequal treatment is acceptable. For example, within
the United States the debates concerning homosexual persons serving in the military
(they are not allowed to openly do so) and homosexual marriage (permitted in only a few
states and contested in most of those) could not exist if homosexual individuals were
viewed and treated as equal in status to their heterosexual counterparts; prejudice has
consequences.
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Two early studies on religious fundamentalism and homosexuality employed a
Christian specific measurement of religious fundamentalism and examined prejudice
toward homosexual individuals. The first study found religious fundamentalism was
positively and significantly correlated with prejudice toward homosexual individuals
(McFarland, 1989), as did the second (Kirkpatrick, 1993). The researchers suggested that
Biblical literalism could account for the prejudice against homosexual individuals, as the
Bible condemns homosexuality, or that closed-mindedness impacts the attitudes of
persons high in religious fundamentalism toward homosexuality. However, these
explanations do not adequately account for ignoring tenets to treat others with
compassion and kindness or explain why Biblical literalism and closed-mindedness
should prevent someone from doing so.
Later studies on religious fundamentalism and prejudice found similar results
(Altemeyer, 2003; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Fulton et al., 1999; Hunsberger,
1996; Hunsberger et al., 1999; Jackson & Esses, 1997). In a study employing Canadian
undergraduates and their parents as participants, including nonreligious individuals,
Jewish adherents, and followers of Christianity, religious fundamentalism was positively
and significantly correlated with hostile attitudes toward those of a homosexual
orientation for the combined undergraduate and the parent samples (Altemeyer &
Hunsberger, 1992). This finding was replicated in an additional study involving
Caucasian Canadian college students and their parents (Altemeyer, 2003), which found
religious fundamentalism was significantly correlated with prejudice toward homosexual
individuals for both the students and parents.
Two studies investigated religious fundamentalism and prejudicial attitudes
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toward homosexual individuals in religions other than Christianity. The first study
utilized a community sample of Canadian Muslims, Hindus, and Jews (Hunsberger,
1996). Fundamentalism within each of these faiths correlated significantly with prejudice
toward homosexual individuals. The second study examined not only fundamentalism
and prejudice in religions other than Christianity, but also in Christianity and Islam in
another country. The participants included Christian and Muslim university students
from Ghana, along with Christian and non-Christian university students from Canada
(Hunsberger et al., 1999). Religious fundamentalism was significantly correlated with
prejudice toward homosexual individuals for the Ghanaian Muslim individuals, Ghanaian
Christians, and Canadian Christians. Thus, overall these four later studies found the
relationship between religious fundamentalism and prejudice toward homosexual
individuals remained across diverse participant and cultural samples and that the
characteristics of persons high in religious fundamentalism appeared to be quite similar
across religions and cultures as well, suggesting that similar psychological processes are
operating for those high in religious fundamentalism the world over.
These later studies, when an explanation was offered, conjectured that religious
fundamentalism could come from fear and a sense of moral superiority, which, in
combination with the rigidity of beliefs demonstrated by those high in religious
fundamentalism, leads to prejudice against those who disagree with their views
(Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). These explanations may have merit; fear of different
others, a sense of superiority over others, and resistance to the views of others may begin
to account for the mistreatment of others. However, these explanations were offered post
hoc and have never been developed into a framework for synthesizing the literature or
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allowing for predictions of behavior for further research.
One study sought to understand if fundamentalist beliefs accounted in the entirety
for the prejudice by persons high in religious fundamentalism toward homosexual
individuals (Fulton et al., 1999). Prejudice was defined as, “antipathy toward members of
a group in excess of that required by religious value statements” (p. 14). Evaluation of
attitudes towards homosexual individuals was categorized as morally justified (e.g.,
“Homosexuality is a perversion” (p. 17)) or non-morally justified (e.g., “A person’s
homosexuality should not be a cause for job discrimination” (p. 17)). Participants in the
study were Caucasian heterosexual undergraduate students from the United States.
Individuals high in religious fundamentalism were significantly prejudiced against
homosexual individuals overall, as well as when morally justified in this attitude and
when not morally justified. Persons high in religious fundamentalism demonstrated their
tendency to judge homosexual individuals beyond what was morally justified in two
additional ways. First, persons high in religious fundamentalism judged sexually active
homosexual individuals more negatively than they judged sexually-active non-married
heterosexual individuals. Second, those high in religious fundamentalism judged celibate
homosexual persons more negatively than they judged celibate heterosexual individuals.
On the whole, the association between high religious fundamentalism and prejudice
toward homosexual individuals was demonstrated to be stronger than could be justified
by religious beliefs, though no explanation as to why was given.
In an examination of behavior rather than attitudes, a study in the series by
Jackson and Esses (1997) examined the discriminatory behavior of persons high in
religious fundamentalism toward the target groups of homosexual individuals and
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members of the First Nations (Native Canadians). The results of this study mirrored those
found when the target groups were single mothers and students, with religious
fundamentalism significantly correlated with perceiving homosexual individuals as
threatening to their values, responsible for the unemployment problem, and in need of
personal change. However, religious fundamentalism was not significantly related to the
perception of the members of the First Nations as value threatening, with blaming them
for their unemployment, or with endorsing one form of helping over another for them.
Value-threat offers a possible reason for the discriminatory behavior by those high in
religious fundamentalism and may provide a starting point to understand why their
prejudicial attitudes toward homosexual individuals are beyond that required by their
beliefs: persons high in religious fundamentalism may be reacting defensively.
Altogether, religious fundamentalism is correlated with prejudice and
discrimination toward homosexual individuals in several countries and numerous
religions. Various explanations have been offered for the relationship, but Biblical
literalism and closed-mindedness are insufficient to explain it and fear, moral superiority,
and value-threat have not been developed into a larger model useful for predictions and
for generating further study.
Other Religions
In addition to its association with prejudice toward women and homosexual
individuals, religious fundamentalism has been found to be correlated with prejudice and
discrimination toward other religions. The global implications of prejudice toward
religions different from one’s own can be seen throughout recorded history (e.g., consider
the Crusades) and continue into the present (e.g., Israeli religious Jewish right-wing
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settler movement versus Palestinian Muslims). Individuals high in religious
fundamentalism believe they have the truth and the one true faith and that others should
have the same truth and faith as well; understanding the psychology of fundamentalism is
truly of global importance.
One study specifically investigated fundamentalism and prejudicial attitudes
toward other religions (Altemeyer, 2003). Participants included Caucasian Canadian
college students and their parents, with results indicating religious fundamentalism was
significantly correlated with negative attitudes toward those of other religions for both the
student and the parent samples. The researchers also assessed whether early religious
identification was emphasized in the childhoods of the student participants. These
participants received additional questions asking about their early gender, racial, and
religious identity training in their families. Religious fundamentalism was not
significantly related to gender or racial identity training, but was significantly correlated
with early religious identity training.
The researchers suggested that the relationship between religious fundamentalism
and prejudice toward other religions might be due to a strong us-versus-them favoritism
learned through considerable religious social identification in early childhood
(Altemeyer, 2003). The prejudice toward other religions, which cannot be explained
adequately in terms of beliefs, may be simply learned in the “ethnocentrism school”
(Altemeyer, 2003, p. 27) of childhood religion. Children are taught that their religion is
necessarily better than others’ religions and learn to act accordingly. Yet, this still does
not explain why a belief system that embraces kindness towards others embraces open
antipathy toward specific groups, especially other religions.
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Beyond attitudes, a later study investigated the relationship between religious
fundamentalism and discrimination by examining helping behavior toward religious ingroups and out-groups contrasted with non-religious in-groups and out-groups (Gribbins
& Vandenberg, in press). Helping behavior was measured directly through differences in
recommended donations to the two in-group and out-group comparisons. Importantly, the
religious in-group versus religious out-group was designed to trigger responses related to
fundamentalist values concerning other religions, while the nonreligious in-group versus
nonreligious out-group was intended to not activate religious fundamentalist values
toward other religions. Results indicated religious fundamentalism significantly and
positively influenced helping behavior in favor of religious in-groups, but did not impact
helping toward nonreligious in-groups over out-groups. When religious values were not
involved, a strong us-versus-them favoritism did not apply.
The researchers contended that the relationship between religious fundamentalism
and helping changed in different circumstances; when the values of persons high in
religious fundamentalism were threatened, in this case by other religions, their pattern of
helping altered from when their values were not threatened (Gribbins & Vandenberg, in
press). The researchers further proposed that religious fundamentalism was more than a
set of religious tenets in that it was a worldview. As the fundamentalists’ worldview
included the components that their beliefs, values, knowledge, experiences, and thoughts
were given by an omniscient, omnipotent, and omni-powerful being, any opposition to
that worldview, especially by other religions, would become highly salient in determining
the behaviors of persons high in religious fundamentalism toward others, including to
whom help should be provided. Value-threat and worldview defense do begin to offer
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insight into the psychology of those high in fundamentalism; different others may be
threatening to their values and view of the world. However, value-threat and worldview
defense are not a comprehensive theory of religious fundamentalism nor capable of
explaining the larger literature or providing an adequate basis for making predictions for
further research; groups are deemed threatening to the values and worldview of those
high in religious fundamentalism with no further inquiry required.
In summary, religious fundamentalism is strongly associated with prejudicial
attitudes toward other religions, though only one study has examined this relationship.
Fundamentalism is also correlated with strong reactions to the presence of other religions,
though again only one study has examined this phenomenon. Further, once more, no one
comprehensive explanation for these findings has been offered in the literature.
Comparative levels of prejudice
Studies that examined prejudice toward both women and homosexual individuals
demonstrate that the correlation between fundamentalism and prejudice toward
homosexual individuals tends to be stronger than that toward women (see Table 1), even
when different prejudice measures are used. When discriminatory behavior is considered,
high religious fundamentalism is associated similarly with perceiving both single mothers
and homosexual individuals as threatening to values (.48 and .47, respectively) (Jackson
& Esses, 1997). However, fundamentalism demonstrated a much stronger correlation
with endorsing personal change for homosexual individuals (r = .72) than for single
mothers (r = .39) as the best manner of helping them. Although persons high in religious
fundamentalism demonstrate prejudice and discrimination toward women and
homosexual individuals, research suggests that they are most strongly prejudiced against
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those of other religions, with the strength of the correlations ranging from .78 to .82
(Altemeyer, 2003); however, prejudice against these three target groups have not been
investigated within the same participant sample. The current literature on religious
fundamentalism and prejudice offers no comprehensive explanation or theory as to why
fundamentalism is associated with prejudice and discrimination toward women,
homosexual individuals, or other religions; neither does it provide reasons for why there
appears to be differences in the magnitudes of these associations. Perhaps, these groups
introduce uncertainty to fundamentalist beliefs or threaten religious fundamentalists in
some manner and vary, in increasing severity, in the extent to which they do so.
Overview and Criticisms
Religious fundamentalism is associated with prejudice toward women,
homosexual individuals, and other religions. These relationships exist across a variety of
participant samples, including persons from several countries and religions. Yet,
considered together, the extant literature on religious fundamentalism and prejudice has
several limitations. First, the studies are primarily correlational in nature. Rarely are
mediating or moderating factors investigated or the psychological processes involved
addressed. Unfortunately, researchers have largely ignored the complexity of the
relationships in which religious fundamentalism is involved. A second limitation is that it
is treated solely as an individual difference variable. However, the evidence suggests that
religious fundamentalism is influenced by context (e.g., see Gribbins & Vandenberg, in
press; Jackson & Esses, 1997). Specifically, circumstances may influence the manner in
which the attitudes and behaviors of persons high in religious fundamentalism are
expressed.
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Third, varied explanations have been given for the relationships between religious
fundamentalism and prejudice. These reasons include Biblical literalism and beliefs,
closed-mindedness, moral superiority and self-righteousness, us-versus-them favoritism,
contextual aspects, fear, value-threat, and worldview defense. These explanations are
primarily offered post hoc and are fragmentary. Previously there has not been any one
satisfactory explanation given to account for the different prejudices associated with
religious fundamentalism. For example, while value-threat and worldview defense appear
to offer the beginnings of a larger framework upon which to hang the findings in the
religious fundamentalism literature, they are insufficient in that they do not provide a
means for predictions or a basis for further research. While value-threat and worldview
are unsatisfactory, none of the other reasons that have been employed offers even the
beginnings of a larger explanatory framework.
Taken together, the limitations in the current literature discussed above lead to the
fourth, and overarching, criticism of the religious fundamentalism and prejudice
literature: there is no established theory. There is no theoretical foundation providing an
explanatory basis for specific results to any given study, offering a synthesis of results for
the literature as a whole, addressing the complexity of the psychological processes
involved, or accounting for the impact of situational variables. This lack of an integrative
theory has not allowed for a nuanced understanding of religious fundamentalism and
prejudice and has not provided a basis for a generative and systematic study. However, a
framework employed by Jost, Kruglanski, Glaser, & Sulloway (2003) for political
conservatism in which meaning systems, such as religious fundamentalism, are adopted,
at least in part, as a response to uncertainty and threat appears to offer an approach for
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integrating and understanding the religious fundamentalism literature.
Religious Fundamentalism and Threat: A Framework
Political conservatism is a concept that is closely related to religious
fundamentalism both empirically and conceptually (Unger, 2007; Wyatt, 2005). Similar
to religious fundamentalism, political conservatism is associated with justifying
inequality (Jost et al., 2003), which is similar to prejudice in the fundamentalism
literature. Religious fundamentalism and political conservatism are both associated with
other similar attitudes, behaviors, and characteristics as well. For example, both
demonstrate strong correlations with authoritarianism, which includes the tendencies to
submit to authority, aggress against authority-sanctioned targets, and to adhere to
conventional norms (Altemeyer, 1996). Consequently, religious fundamentalism and
political conservatism may share similar psychological processes.
Previously, political conservatism faced difficulties analogous to those of
religious fundamentalism in its literature in that it lacked a unifying theoretical model. In
response, Jost et al. (2003) proposed a model of political conservatism as motivated
social cognition (MSC). According to Jost et al., MSC is at the intersection of situations,
motivations, cognitions, and meaning systems, including political conservatism, that are
espoused, at least in part, because they meet psychological needs. In particular, Jost et al.
proposed that individuals adopt political conservatism, in part, as a response to
uncertainty and threat. Moreover, political conservatism and its associated constructs
(e.g., prejudice and authoritarianism) may all be expressions of the psychological
experiences of opposition to change and preservation of the existing social order,
including the justification of unequal hierarchical systems. A similar, modified,
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framework, in which religious fundamentalism is viewed as a meaning system adopted,
in part, as a response to uncertainty and threat, may be useful as a guide to integrate,
organize, and inform the current literature on religious fundamentalism and prejudice.
Resistance to Change and Maintenance of the Social Order
Religious fundamentalism could be viewed as an exemplar of the psychological
experiences of the opposition to change and preservation of the existing social order,
including the justification of unequal hierarchical systems. By definition, fundamentalists
advocate a return to the basics of their faith (Gatewood, 1969; Johnstone, 1997; Sim,
2004), which “must be followed today according to the fundamental, unchangeable
practices of the past” (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992, p.118). Moreover,
fundamentalism began as a rejection of the modern, liberal, and secular changes to
society (Gatewood, 1969; Johnstone, 1997; Sim, 2004), increased in response to liberal
shifts introduced into the social structure in the 1960s (Chafe, 1999), and continued to
spread throughout the world in response to the transformations to society brought about
by globalization (Salzman, 2008).
Uncertainty and Threat
There is evidence that uncertainty and threat play roles in the attitudes and
discriminatory behavior of persons high in religious fundamentalism, as helping has been
found to be directed more toward groups that do not introduce uncertainty and threat for
such individuals (Gribbins & Vandenberg, in press; Jackson & Esses, 1997). Likewise,
religious fundamentalism has historically increased in response to societal uncertainty
(Chafe, 1999). Additional research outside of the fundamentalism literature suggests
prejudicial behaviors increase in the presence of various threats as well (Greenberg et al.,
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1990; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2000).
Taken together, religious fundamentalism can be perceived as a method of
managing uncertainty and threat and as representative of the psychological experiences of
resistance to change and maintenance of the social order. If this conceptualization is
correct, it may be that the advancement of feminism is seen as a direct threat to the
hierarchical and patriarchic system deemed God-given by those high in religious
fundamentalism. Single mothers may introduce uncertainty to beliefs (e.g., helping the
baby may be seen as condoning sin), and threaten the existing social order for those high
in religious fundamentalism. Homosexual individuals may threaten the beliefs,
knowledge, and social hierarchy supported by individuals high in religious
fundamentalism. The mere idea that homosexual individuals are “acceptable” may be
incompatible with a religious belief structure that contends homosexual persons are an
affront to God. To promote the equality of homosexual persons may be seen as sinful and
threatening to one’s relationship with God both now and in the hereafter. When taken
together, the aggregate of the threats potentially posed by homosexual individuals to
persons high in religious fundamentalism begins to provide understanding of why this
prejudice is beyond what moral dictates require. Further, for those high in religious
fundamentalism, it may be that other religions pose threats to their beliefs and
understanding of the world, their place in the present social order, and their immortality.
Persons high in religious fundamentalism may fear other religions because if other
religions are correct, their immortality plan of is in error. Nevertheless, no studies on
religious fundamentalism and prejudice have examined the impact of direct threat on the
prejudicial attitudes of those high in fundamentalism or considered how different types of
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threat may be important to this relationship.
Different Threats
Two threats that are considered in the political conservatism literature may also be
applicable to religious fundamentalism: epistemic threat and existential threat. Epistemic
threat involves the introduction of uncertainty to beliefs, knowledge, and conclusions
arrived at through “motivated informational search” (Jost et al., 2003, p. 347). Motivated
social cognition contends that individuals are motivated in how they search for
information and how they reach “a given state of knowledge” (Kruglanski, 2001, p. 39),
such that their information processing works in service of defending their beliefs,
knowledge, and conclusions (Kruglanski, 1996). For example, researchers have
speculated that as persons high in religious fundamentalism believe they have the truth,
their contemplation of perspectives contrary to their own may be restricted such that they
may: (a) seek only information confirming their religious teachings, (b) assimilate
information divergent from their beliefs in such a way so as to make it consistent with
their beliefs, (c) avoid information that might challenge their beliefs whenever possible,
and/or (d) accept the religious rationalization for any doubt or concern they may have
(Hunsberger, Alisat, Pancer, & Pratt, 1996).
Existential threat makes salient ontological death anxiety, the self-awareness that
one will die (Castano & Dechesne, 2005; Dechesne, Janssen, & van Knippenberg, 2000;
Friedman, 2008). Existential anxiety is a central feature of Terror Management Theory
(TMT) (Dechesne et al., 2000; Greenberg et al., 1990; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon,
Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). TMT proposes that culturally created worldviews, or belief
systems, such as religious fundamentalism, protect against existential anxiety by offering
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immortality, either literally, through belief in an afterlife, or symbolically, through
contributions to the perpetuation of the belief system itself. TMT further proposes that
culturally created worldview systems require continuous defense against threat. When
threat to the belief system is encountered, defensive reactions intensify (Greenberg et al.,
1990). The standard experimental approach to triggering existential anxiety is to make
mortality salient through asking research participants to write about what they think will
happen to them as they physically die and once they are dead, as well as to describe the
emotions that the thought of their own death arouses. This method is often referred to as a
mortality salience induction (see e.g., Lavine, Lodge, & Frietas, 2005, p. 229).
Within the political conservatism literature, epistemic uncertainty and existential
threat are considered interrelated, but separate constructs (Jost et al., 2003). In a series of
three studies examining the extent to which uncertainty and threat were distinct, latent
variables were employed to represent these constructs (Jost et al., 2007). In each study,
structural equation modeling was used for the analysis and the results demonstrated that,
while a one-factor solution suggesting uncertainty and threat could be considered one
construct was adequate, a two-factor model signifying they are separate constructs was a
significantly better fit for the data. These results indicated that epistemic uncertainty and
existential threat were indeed separate, though related, constructs.
Within the fundamentalism literature, one study has examined the impact of
introducing epistemic uncertainty to the beliefs of those high in religious fundamentalsim
(Friedman & Rholes, 2007). This examination employed the dual-process model of TMT,
which includes distal and proximal defenses of death anxiety (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, &
Solomon, 1999). Distal defenses are unconscious and implicit manners of handling death
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anxiety, which situate a person in a meaningful and death-transcending reality, and
become available in response to subliminal death related stimuli. Proximal defenses
against death anxiety are conscious and readily available when explicitly exposed to
thoughts of one’s mortality (Friedman & Rholes, 2007; Pyszczynski et al., 1999).
The investigation sought to introduce epistemic uncertainty through a challenge to
the beliefs of those high in religious fundamentalism (Friedman & Rholes, 2007). The
epistemic uncertainty was designed to disrupt their distal defense of death anxiety
(Friedman & Rholes, 2007; Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Participants consisted of Christian
undergraduates from a university in the southern United States, who were assigned to one
of four conditions: the experimental condition, called resurrection inconsistency, and
three control conditions. In the resurrection inconsistency condition, participants were
asked if they believed the Bible contained errors or contradictions, read the four gospel
accounts of the resurrection, and were then provided with a paragraph highlighting the
inconsistencies of the gospels and asked how they explained them. Following these tasks,
participants performed a word-stem completion task that included stems that could
become death-related words. The three control conditions included the resurrection
control condition, which was similar to the inconsistency condition in that they read the
four accounts of the resurrection, but did not include the questions about Biblical errors
or the paragraph pointing out the inconsistencies, and the Bible neutral and the library
control conditions, with the former containing four Bible passages unrelated to the
resurrection or death and the latter consisting of four accounts of a trip to the library.
Participants in the control conditions were asked about the language of the texts and
given the word-stem completion task. Religious fundamentalism was significantly related
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to death-awareness accessibility in the resurrection inconsistency condition only; there
were no differences in death-awareness for persons high in religious fundamentalism in
the other conditions. These results indicated that challenging the beliefs of those high in
religious fundamentalism weakened their distal death-anxiety defenses and thereby
increased unconscious death-awareness (Friedman & Rholes, 2007).
Two studies have investigated religious fundamentalism and existential threat in
the form of mortality salience tasks (Friedman, 2008; Friedman & Rholes, 2008). Within
the dual-process model of TMT, these existential threats are designed to attack the
proximal death-anxiety defenses (Friedman & Rholes, 2007; Pyszczynski et al., 1999).
The first study sought to examine the relationship between fundamentalism and beliefs
about death by investigating the texts composed by participants during a standard
mortality salience exposure (Friedman, 2008). Participants were undergraduates from a
university in the southern United States comprised primarily of Christians (92%).
Participants were asked to write about either the events and emotions surrounding their
own death (mortality salience condition) or the experience of dental pain (control
condition). The quantitative text analysis indicated that for essays in the mortality
salience condition, high religious fundamentalism was significantly and positively
correlated with inclusion of more positive emotion and more future and socially oriented
language than low fundamentalism (Friedman, 2008). These results suggest that the
proximal death-anxiety defenses of persons high in religious fundamentalism are not
weakened by standard mortality salience manipulations; rather, it appears that
fundamentalism defends well against conscious death anxiety.
The second study examined the role of religious fundamentalism in secular
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worldview defense under conditions of mortality salience (Friedman & Rholes, 2008).
Participants were again undergraduate students from a university in the southern United
States. They were assigned to a mortality salience or dental pain condition and asked to
write about the events and emotions surrounding these events. They were then given two
essays, one in support of universal compliance with a campus tradition and one in favor
of personal choice in following the tradition. After reading each essay, participants
answered questions about the author. These questionnaires were summed separately and
then the anti-tradition responses subtracted from the pro-tradition responses to form an
index of secular worldview validation. Low fundamentalism was associated with more
secular worldview defense in the mortality salience condition than in the control
condition; this was a typical defensive response to mortality salience induction.
Individuals high in fundamentalism did not significantly differ in secular worldview
defense by condition, an atypical response to mortality salience. In further analysis of the
texts participants wrote, in the mortality salience condition, religious fundamentalism was
positively associated with peace and acceptance themed words and negatively correlated
with uncertainty related words. Religious fundamentalism was also associated with
positive mood in both conditions (Friedman, 2008). These results indicated that under
mortality salience conditions, fundamentalism attenuated defense of a secular worldview
and promoted positive emotional responses to conscious thoughts of death; once more
fundamentalism defended proximal death-related anxiety well.
A final series of studies, though not specific to religious fundamentalism,
examined the relationship between belief in a literal afterlife and existential threat in the
form of mortality salience (Dechesne et al., 2003). Participants were undergraduates from

Fundamentalism and threat

27

the Netherlands (studies 1 and 2) and from a Midwestern university in the United States
(study 3). In the first two studies, participants completed several personality measures,
read one of two articles with positions arguing either for or against a literal life after
death, and completed either a mortality salience task or a control manipulation (write
about events and emotion surrounding the experience of watching television for study 1
or dental pain for study 2). The second study also included a neutral condition in which
participants read an article on animal navigation and answered questions similar to those
in the control conditions. After reading the articles and writing their responses,
participants were provided feedback about their personality (the feedback was the same
and positive for all participants) and asked to rate whether they agreed with the
personality assessment. In both studies, individuals in the mortality salience condition
who read the article against an afterlife rated the personality assessment as more accurate
than those in the control or neutral conditions; this difference did not occur for those
participants who read the pro-afterlife essay. The results indicated that priming belief in
an afterlife decreased the need for participants to engage in the defense of their selfesteem under the mortality salience condition, an atypical mortality salience reaction
(Dechesne et al., 2003).
The third study in the series extended the first two by presenting the pro- and antiafterlife articles in two ways, as a hard news article or as an anecdotal, soft news article,
and by asking participants to provide punishments to transgressors of societal norms, as
well as assessing participant greed via a bidding scenario (Dechesne et al., 2003). As
before, participants were assigned to a mortality salience or control manipulation (dental
pain). Results mirrored those of the previous two studies in that for participants in the
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mortality salience condition, those who read either of the anti-afterlife articles
demonstrated significantly more punishment of transgressors than did the participants in
the control condition; the effects were attenuated for those participants who read the proafterlife articles. The analysis of greed followed the same pattern for male participants
with significantly more greed in the anti-after life conditions, but was nonsignificant for
female participants. Once more, these results indicated that belief in a literal afterlife
attenuated the prototypical defensive responses to mortality salience induction (Dechesne
et al., 2003). It may be, as a literal afterlife is by definition an element of religious
fundamentalists’ tenets, that this belief in the hereafter contributes to the atypical
responses to mortality salience seen in the fundamentalism literature.
In sum, the one study of religious fundamentalism and epistemic uncertainty
indicates that at the distal level of death-anxiety defense, the introduction of uncertainty
to beliefs increases unconscious death awareness for those high in religious
fundamentalism (Friedman & Rholes, 2007). The literature for religious fundamentalism
and existential threat indicates that at the proximal level of death-anxiety defense,
religious fundamentalism defends well against death anxiety and is significantly
associated with positive emotions and mood, a future and social orientation, peace,
acceptance, and decreased uncertainty, as well as a lessened need to defend a secular
worldview (Friedman, 2008; Friedman & Rholes, 2008). Furthermore, related studies on
belief in a literal afterlife demonstrate that this belief inhibits typical defensive responses
to mortality salience (Dechesne et al., 2003). As religious fundamentalism includes belief
in an afterlife, this further suggests that persons high in religious fundamentalism will not
demonstrate typical responses to mortality salience manipulations.
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Present Study and Hypotheses
The present study examined the relationship between religious fundamentalism
and prejudice toward women, homosexual individuals, and those of other religions in the
presence of two conditions of threat, along with a control condition. Epistemic
uncertainty was introduced in the form of a challenge to fundamentalists’ beliefs, while
existential threat was presented as a mortality salience induction. It was expected that
overall, individuals high in religious fundamentalism would demonstrate greater
prejudice than those low in religious fundamentalism. Further, it was expected that,
because disputing fundamentalists’ beliefs increases unconscious death awareness, an
attack on their distal defenses through a challenge to their beliefs would result in greater
prejudicial attitudes for those high in fundamentalism in the epistemic uncertainty
condition than in either the existential threat or control conditions. For individuals high in
religious fundamentalism, it was predicted that the existential threat and control
conditions would result in similar levels of prejudicial attitudes, as mortality salience has
not resulted in increased defensiveness for persons high in religious fundamentalism in
previous studies. For individuals low in religious fundamentalism, it was expected that
prejudicial attitudes would be greater in the existential threat condition than in the
epistemic uncertainty or control conditions, as these individuals tend to respond in the
more typically defensive manner to mortality salience tasks and because the challenge to
beliefs was unlikely to be disquieting to them.
An additional question the study sought to address was whether there was a
differential impact from the threat conditions on the different prejudices. For those high
in religious fundamentalism, it was predicted that there would be a greater impact on
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prejudice toward other religions in the epistemic uncertainty condition because a
fundamentalist belief was being disputed and religious fundamentalism previously has
been most strongly associated with prejudice toward other religions. For those low in
religious fundamentalism, it was expected that the impact on prejudice toward women
and homosexual individuals would be greater in the existential threat condition than on
that toward other religions, as religion is less salient for them.
The current study measured right-wing authoritarianism to control for its impact
in the presence of threat and on prejudicial attitudes. Right-wing authoritarianism is
defined as a constellation of attitudes, including tendencies to: (a) submit to those
considered to be authorities; (b) aggress toward others, especially when an authority
figure sanctions the aggression; and (c) adhere to conventional social norms seen as
approved by society and instituted by authority (Altemeyer, 1996). Right-wing
authoritarianism correlates significantly with religious fundamentalism (r values ranging
from .47 to as high as .89) (see e.g., Altemeyer, 1996; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992;
Hunsberger, 1996; Hunsberger et al., 1996; and Hunsberger et al., 1999) and with
prejudice toward women (as high as .66) and homosexual individuals (as high as .74) (see
e.g., Hunsberger, 1996 and Hunsberger et al., 1999). Individuals high in right-wing
authoritarianism have also been shown to respond defensively to threats to their religious
beliefs by dismissing evidence that conflicts with their religious teachings (Altemeyer,
1988).
Method
Participants
Data were collected from 396 undergraduates from the subject pool at the
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University of Missouri-St. Louis, who received credit in their psychology courses in
return for their involvement. Because the study was investigating the effects of specific
threats, including a challenge to Christian religious beliefs, only those participants who
were Christian were considered. Of the 396 student participants, 192 met the
requirements for inclusion in the study; 126 participants were excluded because they
were non-Christian, 38 for incomplete data, 32 because they were present during a
disrupted data-collection session, 5 for failure to follow directions, and 3 for failure to
demonstrate understanding of their experimental-condition article. The resulting sample
consisted of 145 females and 47 males with an average age of 24 years. There were 90
African Americans, 84 Caucasians, 9 Multiracial individuals, 4 Asian, 2 Hispanic, 1
Native American, and 2 that listed themselves as Other (see Table 2 for additional
classification information).
Threat Conditions
Three threat scenarios (Appendix A) were created to expose participants to
epistemic uncertainty, existential threat, or control (no threat) conditions. Participants in
each threat condition read a short article that they were asked to imagine would occur one
month in the future. After reading the article, participants were asked to answer two
questions related to their article. The epistemic uncertainty scenario described the
discovery of ancient parchments, which linked the story of Jesus to earlier Sumerian
mythology, and concluded that Jesus never existed. Following the article, participants
were asked to write what they thought the meaning of the discovery would be and the
emotions the thought of the discovery aroused in them. The existential threat vignette
depicted the recollections of a soldier whose comrade died. Participants were then asked

Fundamentalism and threat

32

to respond to typical mortality salience induction questions in which they described what
they thought would happen to them as they died and once they were dead and the
emotions the thought of their own death aroused in them (see e.g., Lavine et al., 2005, p.
229). The control condition presented an article about a manatee that trekked to Cape
Cod. Participants in this control condition were asked to describe what they believed the
meaning of the article was and the emotions it aroused in them. The questions were added
to the epistemic uncertainty and control conditions, and the article added to the mortality
salience induction in the existential threat condition, to maintain procedural symmetry
across threat conditions. In each condition, participants were given limited space in which
to compose their answers.
Measures
Demographics. Participants completed a demographic questionnaire that included
information on age, gender, race, education, and religious affiliation and attendance
(Appendix B).
Religious fundamentalism. Religious fundamentalism was measured using the
Revised 12-item Religious Fundamentalism Scale, which is a self-report scale in a ninepoint Likert format (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004). The revised scale is a revision of
the original 20-item scale, with improved internal consistency, broader coverage of the
construct, and similar reliability. Test items include the statements, “The basic cause of
evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously fighting against God,”
and “God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation,
which must be totally followed” (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004, p.52). Assessments of
construct validity have been demonstrated through correlations made to hostility toward
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homosexuals for Hindus, Jews, Muslims, and Christians with r values ranging from .42 to
.78 (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992, 2004; Hunsberger et al., 1999). Interitem reliability
for this study was ά = .90.
Attitudes toward women. Attitudes toward women was measured via the Sexist
Attitudes Toward Women Scale (Benson & Vincent, 1980), modified by the removal of
10 items due to their being outdated (see Hunsberger et al., 1999) and by extending the
Likert scale from a seven-point to a nine-point measure. Test items include the
statements, “It bothers me to see a man being told what to do by a woman,” and “Women
rely more on intuition and less on reason than men do.” Construct validity has been
demonstrated through correlations with attributions of humor to sexist jokes and of
traditional sex-role stereotypes for women (r values from .36 to .68) (Benson & Vincent,
1980). The original interitem reliability was ά = .91 (Benson & Vincent, 1980), with the
modified version demonstrating similar results with ά ranging from .82 to .91
(Hunsberger et al., 1999). Interitem reliability for this study was ά = .84.
Attitudes toward homosexual individuals. Prejudice toward homosexual
individuals was measured with the Attitudes toward Homosexuals Scale (Altemeyer,
1996), a self-report measure in nine-point Likert format. Test items include the
statements, “In many ways, the AIDS disease currently killing homosexuals is just what
they deserve,” and “Homosexuals should be forced to take whatever treatments science
can some up with to make them normal.” Construct validity has been demonstrated
through correlations with right-wing authoritarianism (r values from .50 to .60)
(Altemeyer, 1988). Interitem reliability for this study was ά = .91.
Attitudes toward other religions. Prejudicial attitudes toward other religions were
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measured with the Religious Ethnocentrism Scale (Altemeyer, 2003). This self-report
scale is in nine-point Likert format. Test items include, “All people may be entitled to
their own religious beliefs, but I don’t want to associate with people whose views are
quite different from my own, “ and “I would be against letting some other, different
religion use my church for its services when we were not using it.” Assessments of
construct validity have been demonstrated through correlations with racial and ethnic
ethnocentrism with r values ranging from .49 to .52. Interitem reliability for this study
was ά = .91.
Authoritarianism. Right-wing authoritarianism was assessed via the 1996 version
of the Right-wing Authoritarianism Scale (Altemeyer, 1996). This scale is a self-report
measure in nine-point Likert format consisting of 30 questions. Test items include the
statements, “Obedience and respect of authority are the most important virtues children
should learn,” and “Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the
perversion eating away at our moral fiber and tried beliefs.” Construct validity has been
demonstrated via correlations with submission to established authority (r values from .42
to .16); authority supported aggression against lawbreakers (r from .40 to .50) and peers
in a learning situation (r = .43); and hostility to nonconventional persons such as
homosexual individuals (r from .26 to .51). Interitem reliability for this study was ά = .91.
Social desirability. Social desirability was evaluated to determine whether
socially desirable responding influenced the measurements of prejudice. Socially
desirable responding was assessed by the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale,
Form C, which is a 13-item self-report scale in a true/ false format and is a shortened
revision of the original 33-item scale (Reynolds, 1982). The items are summed, with true
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= 1 and false = 2, to create an overall score, with higher scores indicating a tendency to
provide socially desirable responses. Test items include, “I am sometimes irritated by
people who ask favors of me,” and “There have been times when I was quite jealous of
the good fortune of others” (Reynolds, 1982, p. 122). A Kuder-Richardson reliability of ά
= .76 has been reported and concurrent validity rating to the original scale has been
reported to be .93 (Reynolds, 1982).
Procedure
Participants were given the demographics questionnaire, the Religious
Fundamentalism Scale, and the Right-wing Authoritarianism Scale, followed by one of
the three threat scenarios determined by random assignment. The participants then were
given the prejudicial attitude measures in counterbalanced order, followed by the Social
Desirability Scale.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
A Multivariate Analysis of Covariance (MANCOVA) was used for the main
analysis and requires equality of the covariance matrices of the dependent variables to
decrease Type I errors (Garson, 2009). The equality of the covariance matrices for
attitudes toward women, attitudes toward homosexual individuals, and attitudes toward
other religions was non-significant at the conservative value of p < .001, with a Box’s M
= .004 (Garson, 2009; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001); the assumption of equality of
covariance matrices was met. MANCOVA analysis also requires equality of the error
variances for the dependent variables to decrease Type I errors (Garson, 2009). The
equality of error variances for attitudes toward women, attitudes toward homosexual
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individuals, and attitudes toward other religions was non-significant, with Levene’s Test
ranging from .302 to .693; the assumption of equality of error variances was met.
Additionally, MANCOVA analysis requires a low measurement error for any covariates
to decrease Type II errors (Garson, 2009). The interitem reliability of right-wing
authoritarianism was ά = .91, well above the suggested interitem reliability of >.80
(Garson, 2009; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001); the assumption of low measurement error for
the covariate was met. These analyses suggested the probability of Type I and Type II
error for the main analysis would be within acceptable statistical limits, ensuring
confidence in rejection of the null and in detection of a significant relationship should one
exist.
MANCOVA is sensitive to outliers (Garson, 2009; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).
The data were tested for outliers and the influence of outliers through analyses of
Mahalanobis Distance and of Cook’s Distance. Results indicated there were no extreme
or significantly influential outliers; therefore, no deletion of outlying cases was deemed
necessary.
The influence of age, race/ethnicity, social desirability, order, and gender on the
proposed analysis was examined using five separate MANCOVAs with each of these
variables added separately as an independent variable to the model. To analyze the
impact of age, a median split was used to create two groups; age was non-significant on
all dependent variables and therefore not added as a covariate to the final model. To
analyze race/ethnicity, participants were divided into three categories, African American,
Caucasian, and other; race/ethnicity was non-significant on all dependent variables and
therefore not added as a covariate to the final model. To analyze social desirability, a
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median split was used to create two groups; social desirability was non-significant on all
dependent variables and therefore not added as a covariate to the final model. The six
different order combinations were included in a MANCOVA; order was non-significant
on all dependent variables and therefore not added as a covariate to the final model. The
MANCOVA for gender, however, was significant on attitudes toward women, F(1,191) =
11.613 p < .001, and on attitudes toward homosexual individuals, F(1,191) = 28.142, p <
.001. For this reason, gender was added as a covariate to the final model.
Sample Size
A priori power and effect size analysis suggested a sample size of approximately
160 was needed to achieve power of .80 with an effect size of .25 (Buchner, Erdfelder,
Faul, & Lang, 1992-2006). The main analysis included 192 participants, adequately
meeting this requirement. MANCOVA further requires a minimum sample size wherein
every cell contains more cases than there are dependent variables in the model (Garson,
2009). Cell sizes ranged from a low of 8 cases to a high of 23, with no cell containing
fewer cases than the number of dependent variables (three). Cell size was sufficient for
all cells to be included in the analysis.
Main Analyses
Hypothesis I predicted individuals high in religious fundamentalism would
demonstrate greater prejudice than those low in religious fundamentalism on all
dependent variables. The measure of religious fundamentalism was made categorical
using a quartile split of the RF Scale, referred to as RF Group. Testing of the hypothesis
was completed using a 4 (RF Group) x 3 (Threat Condition) MANCOVA, controlling for
authoritarianism and gender. Results indicated that the combined dependent variables
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were significantly influenced by RF Group, Wilks’ Lambda F(9, 183) = 7.725, p < .001.
The tests of between-subjects effects indicated RF Group was significant for all
dependent variables: attitudes toward women— F(3,189) = 3.795, p < .011; Effect size =
.06 Partial eta2, Observed Power = .81; attitudes toward homosexual individuals—
F(3,189) = 6.512, p < .001; Effect size = .10 Partial eta2, Observed Power = .97; and
attitudes toward persons of other religions— F(3,189) = 14.227, p < .001; Effect size =
.19 Partial eta2, Observed Power = 1.0.
Post hoc comparisons (Bonferroni) were made between the four levels of RF
Group. Individuals high in religious fundamentalism demonstrated significantly more
negative attitudes toward women than those low in religions fundamentalism (see Figure
1). Individuals high in religious fundamentalism demonstrated significantly more
prejudice toward homosexual individuals than all other RF Groups, including those low
in religious fundamentalism (see Figure 2). Individuals high in religious fundamentalism
demonstrated significantly more prejudice toward persons of other religions than all other
RF Groups, including those low in religious fundamentalism (see Figure 3). Hypothesis I
was supported. Individuals high in religious fundamentalism demonstrated greater
prejudicial attitudes toward women, homosexual individuals, and persons of other
religions than those low in religious fundamentalism.
Previous studies in the religious fundamentalism literature have not measured
prejudice toward women, homosexual individuals, and those of other religions in the
same sample. Investigations have looked at religious fundamentalism and prejudice
toward other races, homosexual individuals, and other religions and found the strongest
relationship with prejudice toward other religions, concluding that prejudice toward other
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religions is stronger than other prejudices for those high in religious fundamentalism
(Altemeyer, 2003). In the present study, the correlations between religious
fundamentalism and the prejudice measures followed the pattern seen in the literature
(see Table 1), with correlations of .16 with attitudes toward women, .56 with attitudes
toward homosexual individuals, and .70 with attitudes toward other religions. Moreover,
the effect sizes differed in magnitude for each relationship between religious
fundamentalism and prejudice: .06 for attitudes toward women, .10 toward homosexual
individuals, and .19 toward other religions. The strongest relationship and effect size was
between religious fundamentalism and prejudice toward other religions. These findings
add support to the contention that individuals high in religious fundamentalism
demonstrate the greatest prejudice toward those of other religions in that the degree of
prejudice toward other religions was stronger than that toward women or homosexual
individuals.
Hypothesis II predicted an interaction effect between fundamentalism and threat
condition. Those high in religious fundamentalism were expected to demonstrate greater
prejudice in the epistemic uncertainty (belief threat) condition than in the existential
threat (mortality salience) or control conditions. Those low in religious fundamentalism
were anticipated to exhibit greater prejudice in the existential threat condition than in the
epistemic uncertainty or control conditions. The tests of between-subjects effects
indicated the interaction between RF Group and threat condition was non-significant for
all dependent variables. The hypothesis was not supported; the relationship between
religious fundamentalism and prejudice did not change by threat condition.
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Hypothesis III predicted a differential impact by threat condition on the three
prejudices. It was expected that epistemic uncertainty would result in a greater impact on
prejudice toward other religions for those high in religious fundamentalism, and that
existential threat would have a greater impact on prejudice toward women and
homosexual individuals for those low in religious fundamentalism. The interaction
between RF Group and threat condition was not significant for any of the dependent
variables. The hypothesis was not supported; threat condition did not differentially
impact prejudice toward other religions for those high in religious fundamentalism nor
toward women and homosexual individuals for those low in religious fundamentalism.
Discussion
This study sought to investigate the relationship between religious
fundamentalism and prejudice toward women, homosexual individuals, and those of
other religions in the presence of different types of threat. Religious fundamentalism has
correlated with various prejudices repeatedly with the evidence suggesting its strongest
relationship is to prejudice toward other religions (Altemeyer, 2003; Altemeyer &
Hunsberger, 1992, 1993; Fulton et al., 1999; Hunsberger, 1995, 1996; Hunsberger et al.,
1999; Kirkpatrick, 1993; McFarland, 1989). However, no unifying theoretical framework
had previously been offered to satisfactorily explain these prejudicial relationships or
their differences in strength. It was therefore proposed that religious fundamentalism, as
an exemplar of the psychological processes of opposition to change and support of the
social order, may be a belief system that is adopted as one means of managing
uncertainty and threat. Thus, two types of threat were introduced, epistemic uncertainty,
in the form of a challenge to beliefs, and existential threat, in the form of a mortality
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salience induction, along with a control condition, to examine their impact on the
relationship between religious fundamentalism and prejudice.
It was expected that individuals high in religious fundamentalism would
demonstrate greater prejudice than those low in religious fundamentalism under all threat
conditions. Results supported this prediction. Previous studies had suggested for those
high in religious fundamentalism prejudice toward other religions was greater than
toward other races and homosexual individuals (Altemeyer, 2003). The present study
provides evidence that prejudice toward other religions is also greater than that toward
women, as well as homosexual individuals, for those high in religious fundamentalism.
Of note, this study controlled for the influence of right-wing authoritarianism. Some
researchers have suggested that the relationship between religious fundamentalism and
prejudice does not hold without the impact of right-wing authoritarianism (Laythe,
Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001). Nevertheless, with the influence of right-wing
authoritarianism accounted for, the relationships between religious fundamentalism and
prejudice toward women, homosexual individuals, and other religions held,
demonstrating religious fundamentalism is itself a strong predictor of prejudice. The
present study also provides support for the relative degrees of prejudice suggested by the
pattern of the strength of correlations in the literature (see Table 1). The previous
correlations implied that the strength of the relationship between fundamentalism and
attitudes toward women has been less than that with prejudice toward homosexual
individuals and that the strongest relationship was with attitudes toward other religions.
This study offers support for this implication in that individuals high in religious
fundamentalism demonstrated a lesser degree of prejudice toward women than toward
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homosexual individuals and the most prejudice toward those of other religions, as
indicated by the configuration of the correlations with the prejudice measures and by the
effect sizes found.
The proposed theoretical framework offers explanations for the prejudice
demonstrated by those high in religious fundamentalism and for the differences in
magnitudes of the prejudices shown. If the framework is correct that religious
fundamentalism is an expression of the psychological processes of opposition to change
and support for the existing social order and is a belief system adopted in part to manage
uncertainty and threat, its relationship with prejudice is a manifestation of the degree of
uncertainty and threat various groups embody. Consider prejudice toward women.
Individuals high in religious fundamentalism demonstrated greater prejudice toward
women than those low in religious fundamentalism, but not significantly more so than
persons exhibiting a moderate level of religious fundamentalism (see Figure 1).
Interestingly, the relationship between religious fundamentalism and prejudice toward
women was not as direct as that with prejudice toward homosexual individuals (see
Figure 2) or other religions (see Figure 3). Persons low in religious fundamentalism
demonstrated low prejudice toward women and those high in religious fundamentalism
demonstrated high prejudice toward women, but so did individuals demonstrating a
moderate level of religious fundamentalism. Yet, the strength of the correlation and of the
effect size for the relationship between religious fundamentalism and attitudes toward
women was small and weaker than that found for attitudes toward homosexual
individuals and other religions. In addition, the correlations among the prejudice
measures themselves suggest religion is more involved in prejudice toward homosexual
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individuals than it is toward women; the measure of prejudice toward other religions
correlated more strongly to attitudes toward homosexual individuals (.68) than to
attitudes toward women (.40).
In the relationship between religious fundamentalism and attitudes toward
women, it may be that multiple forces are involved. The changes to the daily roles of
women brought about by the women’s rights movement over the past 30 years in the
United States may have moderated the perceived threat of change and disruption to the
secular social order women pose. That is, women are in secular positions of authority and
power, yet the social order has not collapsed. However, women may continue to pose a
threat to the traditional patriarchic and hierarchical power structure in the church.
Women’s roles in Christian fundamentalist churches often remain restricted, with women
denied positions that would place them in authority over men. It may be that negative
attitudes toward women are exemplified in the church such that, even for persons for
whom religion is only moderately salient, the message is internalized that men are over
women, women have their place, and this is as it should be. Perhaps there is a clash
between the improvements made for women’s rights in the secular world battling against
the credence given to prejudice toward women in the religious sphere. Thus, a weak
correlation and effect size between religious fundamentalism and attitudes toward women
is demonstrated overall, but a difference in the degree of prejudice toward women is seen
between those for whom religion is unimportant and those for whom religion is salient,
however slightly. Women may not be as threatening to the secular social order as they
once were for those for whom religion is moderately to extremely important, but the need
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remains to protect the traditional hierarchical power structure in the church and, perhaps,
wherever else possible.
For prejudice toward homosexual individuals and persons of other religions,
individuals high in religious fundamentalism demonstrated greater prejudice than all
other levels of religious fundamentalism in this study. It may be that the uncertainty and
threat introduced by homosexual individuals is more than that posed by women, but less
than that by other religions. Homosexual persons may threaten the beliefs and the social
order of those high in religious fundamentalism. For example, homosexuality is often
viewed as a sin by those high in religious fundamentalism. As such, to individuals high in
religious fundamentalism persons who are of a homosexual orientation may be seen as
willfully defying the teachings of Christianity and flaunting their disregard for its rules
for living. Further, as homosexual individuals seek rights to marry and have families,
persons high in religious fundamentalism may view these actions as contrary to the social
order they deem god-given. As for other religions, their existence alone may threaten the
beliefs and the present and future social orders of those high in religious fundamentalism.
By definition, persons high in religious fundamentalism believe they have the truth; thus,
other religions must necessarily be wrong and their continuing presence a sign that evil
continues to exist. Other religions may also introduce doubt to beliefs for those high in
religious fundamentalism, which cannot be tolerated; doubt brings fear that their purpose
and position in this life, and their immortality in the next, are in danger. If those high in
religious fundamentalism have to consider that they might be wrong, the meaning of life
becomes unknown and death anxiety becomes undefended. Thus, the extent of dislike
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toward other religions may be greatest for those high in religious fundamentalism
because other religions introduce the most uncertainty and threat.
It was further expected that persons high in religious fundamentalism would
demonstrate greater prejudice in the epistemic uncertainty condition than in the
existential threat or control conditions. The literature on religious fundamentalism and
TMT suggested that persons high in religious fundamentalism would respond defensively
to a threat to their beliefs, as challenges to their beliefs weakened unconscious deathanxiety defenses (Friedman & Rholes, 2007), but would not do so under a direct threat to
their mortality, as fundamentalism defended well against conscious existential threat
(Friedman, 2008; Friedman & Rholes, 2008). However, there were no significant
differences in prejudice levels between threat conditions for persons high in religious
fundamentalism.
Perhaps the extent of uncertainty and/or threat introduced by the threat conditions
was not as great as that posed by the target groups themselves. The present study
threatened beliefs indirectly via a short article participants were asked to imagine would
appear in the local newspaper one month in the future. The article described the
discovery of ancient parchments linking the story of Jesus to earlier Sumerian mythology
and concluded that Jesus never existed. The only other study in the literature that
introduced a threat to beliefs was direct, asking participants to read the four gospel
accounts of the resurrection and then to read a paragraph highlighting the inconsistencies
between the differing accounts (Friedman & Rholes, 2007). The direct challenge to
beliefs through the use of scripture may have been more distressing and impactful than
the indirect and hypothetical approach taken in the present study.
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It was also expected that persons low in religious fundamentalism would
demonstrate greater prejudice in the existential threat condition than in the epistemic
uncertainty or control conditions. The literature on religious fundamentalism and TMT
had suggested that those low in religious fundamentalism tend to respond defensively in
mortality salience conditions (Friedman, 2008; Friedman & Rholes, 2008). However, in
this study, the prejudice levels of those low in religious fundamentalism were not
influenced by threat condition. It may be that the existential threat introduced in this
study was not powerful enough to alter the strong non-prejudicial attitudes of those low
in religious fundamentalism. In typical mortality-salience induction procedures,
participants are asked to write about the events and emotions surrounding their death
(Lavine, Lodge, & Frietas, 2005). In the present study, an article about a soldier dying
preceded this typical induction. It may be that considering someone else’s death diluted
the impact of the typical procedure.
This study also sought to answer whether there was a differential impact by threat
condition on those high and low in religious fundamentalism. It was anticipated that for
those high in religious fundamentalism, epistemic uncertainty would have a greater
impact on prejudice toward other religions because a religious belief was being
challenged and religion is highly salient to them. For those low in religious
fundamentalism, it was expected that existential threat would have a greater impact on
prejudice toward women and homosexual individuals, as religion is not salient for them.
However, there were no differential impacts on prejudice for those high or low in
religious fundamentalism. Once again, the scenarios used in the present study to
challenge beliefs and introduce mortality salience may not have been powerful enough to
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induce differences in the prejudice expressed by persons high or low in religious
fundamentalism.
Limitations and Future Research
In addition to the methodological difficulties surrounding the uncertainty and
threat scenarios, another problem was that measures of the degree to which participants
felt threatened in each threat condition and by each target group were not included. One
possibility would have been to include direct questions following the scenarios. For the
epistemic uncertainty condition, questions such as, “To what extent did this article
challenge your religious beliefs,” and “How much did the article pose a threat to how you
think about your beliefs,” answered on a Likert scale would have been helpful in
determining if uncertainty to beliefs was introduced. For the existential threat condition,
similar Likert-scale questions such as, “To what extent did considering your own death
cause you to feel threatened about your mortality,” and “To what extent did thinking
about your own death cause you discomfort and anxiety,” would have provided a means
of ascertaining if mortality was made salient and was threatening. Additionally, for both
the threat scenarios and the target groups, one possibility would have been to add a
measure similar to that used by Jackson and Esses (1997) in which participants rated the
degree to which target groups threatened or promoted cherished values. Applying such an
approach in the present study wherein participants rated the extent to which the scenarios
and the target groups threatened their values, traditions, and beliefs would have made
clear whether the groups themselves introduced more uncertainty and threat than the
threat conditions. Perception of degree of uncertainty and threat imposed by condition
and by target groups should be measured in future studies.
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Similarly, perhaps a methodology akin to that suggested above could be employed
to disentangle the long, and decidedly unclear, relationship between religious
fundamentalism and racial/ethnic prejudice (see e.g., Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992 or
Kirkpatrick, 1993). In previous studies, sometimes religious fundamentalism has
correlated with racial/ethnic prejudice and sometimes it has not. It may be that the
inconsistency in the relationship between religious fundamentalism and racial/ethnic
prejudice is due to the associations of the targets groups under consideration with specific
religions. Notably, the instruments used to measure racial/ethnic prejudice in the religious
fundamentalism literature have generally included references to several racial/ethnic
groups rather than concentrating on one (see e.g., the Manitoba Prejudice Scale,
Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). Perhaps this broad approach has further masked the
influence of the religious associations attached to various groups. It would be intriguing
to examine the relationship between religious fundamentalism and prejudice toward
specific races/ethnicities using groups usually associated with specific religions while
measuring the attitudes of participants toward each group separately. For instance, target
groups could include groups who are often associated with Christianity, Islam, and
Judaism. In addition to prejudice measures, participants could rate the degree to which
each target group is associated with a specific religion and to which the group threatens
their values and beliefs. In this manner, it could be determined if what has caused the lack
of clarity in the literature on religious fundamentalism and racial/ethnic prejudice is that
certain groups are representing other religions, because, as shown, individuals high in
religious fundamentalism are strongly prejudiced toward those of other religions.
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Clarification and refinement of the proposed theoretical framework for religious
fundamentalism and prejudice are also needed. In the present study, epistemic uncertainty
and existential threat did not influence prejudice distinctly. The presented model should
be tested to determine if epistemic uncertainty and existential threat are separate
constructs when applied to religious fundamentalism, as presumed in this study. Within
the framework employed by Jost et al. (2003) for political conservatism, epistemic
uncertainty and existential threat have been shown to be separate constructs (Jost et al.,
2007). In a series of studies, epistemic uncertainty was measured through latent variables
such as need for order, openness to new experience, need for predictability, and
intolerance of ambiguity, while existential threat was measured in terms of death anxiety,
system threat including perceptions of terrorism, and fear of a dangerous world.
Structural equation modeling was used and it was determined that epistemic uncertainty
and existential threat were indeed separate, though related, constructs (Jost et al., 2007).
A similar approach should be applied to religious fundamentalism.
From a multicultural perspective, the findings of this study cannot be assumed to
apply beyond Christian undergraduate students in the United States. It may be that
college students are relatively lower in religious fundamentalism than the general
population, which may have influenced the strength of the effects found. Research using
a community sample would clarify the generalizability of the present findings to the
population of Christians in the United States. Further, although research on religious
fundamentalism and prejudice toward women and homosexual individuals has been
conducted in several countries with several religions, prejudice toward persons of other
religions has not been included in these studies. It remains unclear if similar results,
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particularly regarding the strength of prejudice toward other religions, would be found in
religions other than Christianity in countries other than the United States. Future research
expanding beyond these limits is needed. Because religious fundamentalism has global
influence and consequence, understanding the psychological processes of religious
fundamentalism, and how they apply more broadly, is vital.
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Appendix A
Threat Scenarios
Questions for all scenarios were adapted from Lavine, Lodge, & Frietas (2005, p. 229).
Epistemic threat condition. Adapted from Altemeyer (1988, p. 224-225).
Suppose that next month an article appears in the St. Louis Post Dispatch in
which a discovery is revealed.
A group of archeologists working in the Near East announced the discovery of a
group of ancient parchments, very similar to the famous Dead Sea Scrolls, in a Syrian
cave. Except these scrolls are somewhat older. Radiocarbon dating establishes that the
inscriptions were made on the parchments about 200 B.C. ± 100 years. The inscriptions
are in ancient Greek and contain many of the myths and teaching f the “mystery
religions” which arose in Asia Minor at the time. But what is astounding about these
scrolls is that they also contain much of the story of “Jesus” as well.
Specifically, the scrolls tell the story of Attis, a carpenter’s son raised in a Greek
settlement in what is now Lebanon. Attis was born of a virgin, though in this myth his
father was a Zeus-like god. He began a three-year public ministry at the age of 30,
drawing a multitude of followers and eventually coming into conflict with the established
religion in his region. Attis was put to death but arose thee days later and eventually rose
into the heavens. Furthermore, most of the parables, miracle stories, and teaching of the
Gospels are found in these scrolls, which clearly predate the reform movement that arose
in Judaism during the First Century A.D. and which eventually became Christianity.
Other scholars examine the scrolls and eventually pronounce them genuine.
Scholars of Near East religions generally conclude that the long-forgotten myth of Attis
was adapted and embellished by a group of Jewish reformers during the Roman
occupation of Palestine to suit their own purposes— just as much of the book of Genesis
has long been traced to earlier Sumerian myths. In short, there never was a Jesus of
Nazareth.
Imagine for the sake of the following questions that the discovery and conclusions
described above actually occurred. Please answer these questions as seriously and
honestly as possible.
Please, write down, as specifically as you can, what you think the meaning of this
discovery would be.
Please, briefly describe the emotions that the thought of this discovery arouses in you.
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Existential threat condition. Adapted from White (2002, p. 105-108).
Suppose that next month an article appears in the St. Louis Post Dispatch in
which a service member serving overseas provides his personal reflections.
My friend, John Sharp, took a sniper’s bullet in the stomach yesterday. He had his
flak jacket on, but they only protect us from shrapnel. It was a really serious wound, but
the new corpsman said he’s be okay if we could get him evacuated right away.
And then, the fog rolled in, thick. All of the helicopters were grounded again, and
we had no way of getting John out until the weather cleared. The corpsman had to try to
keep him alive for however long it took to for the medevac to come. Food and water
aren’t the only things that are scarce away from base camp— we’re always close to
running out of bandages, glucose, blood expanders, and all the other stuff the corpsmen
need.
We all knew it was bad. I think John knew, too, but he never said so…. The only
time he complained was to say how thirsty he was. The corpsman told us that people with
stomach wounds are not supposed to drink anything, and to try to change the subject
whenever he asked.
John lost feeling in his legs. I tried to reassure him we would get him evacuated
soon and that the doctors would fix him. When John did not say anything for a few
minutes, I was afraid he had passed out— or worse.
He asked me if I would help him write letters to his mother and his wife, and of
course, I said yes.
Both of John’s letters were sweet, and simple, and full of love.
He asked me if I thought the letters would be okay, if his mother and wife would
like them. I told him they would love them. Treasure them.
John died just after 0930 this morning.
Consider for the sake of the following questions your own future death. Please answer
these questions as seriously and honestly as possible.
Please, write down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you
physically die and once you are dead.
Please, briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you.
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No threat, control condition. Adapted from Zezima (2006, August 25).
Suppose that next month an article appears in the St. Louis Post Dispatch in
which a Manatee has traveled far from home.
A meandering manatee has gone where few, if any, of its large, lumbering species
have gone before: Cape Cod. A manatee that has taken an unusual northerly journey,
including to Cape Cod, was spotted Sunday at a storm drainpipe in Warwick, R.I.
The manatee, which biologists believe is the same one spotted in the Hudson
River two weeks ago, was spied in the waters off Falmouth, Mass., last Thursday. The
creature, which officials believe is about 12 feet long and weighs 1,500 pounds, was last
seen off North Kingstown, R.I., on Tuesday, hundred of miles from its home off the
Florida coast.
“It’s, to our knowledge, the northernmost sighting of a manatee ever
documented,” said Cathy A. Beck, a wildlife biologist. Gail Mastrati, a spokeswoman for
the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, said, “He’s the talk of the
town.”
The manatee has been on quite an adventure. It ventured up the Hudson River;
supped from a drainage pipe in Warwick; and, The Cape Cod Times reported, stopped for
a snack of eelgrass in Falmouth Harbor.
Biologists do not know why it went so far north. Ms. Beck suspects it latched
onto a warm ocean current and followed it northward.
Manatees typically reside in inlets and shallow coastal waters in Florida. In the
summer, however, it is common for them to travel as far north as the Carolinas, hugging
the coastline and exploring inlets, Ms. Beck said.
Rhode Island is not completely foreign territory, however. A notorious manatee
nicknamed Chessie, who was rescued from Chesapeake Bay in 1994, swam up to Rhode
Island the next summer. Mr. LaCasse said a manatee was spotted off Point Judith, R.I., a
few years ago.
But until now, Cape Cod was uncharted manatee territory.
Imagine for the sake of the following questions that the story described above actually
occurred. Please answer these questions as seriously and honestly as possible.
Please, write down, as specifically as you can, what you think the meaning of this story
would be.
Please, briefly describe the emotions that the thought of this story arouses in you.
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Appendix B
Demographics
Please, complete the following personal information. Please, complete all items.
1. What is your age? __________
2. Please, indicate your gender: _____ Male _____ Female
3. Please, identify your Race or Ethnicity (check all that apply):
_____ Caucasian
_____ African American
_____ Hispanic
_____ Asian; please, mark your country of racial origin
_____ Japanese _____ Filipino _____ Chinese _____ Pacific Islander
_____ Other Asian; please, write your country of racial origin _____________
_____ Native American; please, indicate your tribal affiliation(s) ___________________
_____ Other
4. How many years of education have you completed? _____ 12 years (High School/
GED) _____ 13 years (1 year of college) _____ 14 years (2 years of college)
_____ 15 years (3 years of college) _____ 16 years (College degree)
_____ Over 16 years
5. Are you presently married? _____ No _____ Yes
6. Are you a parent? _____ No _____ Yes
7. What is your religious affiliation?
_____ Protestant
_____ Catholic
_____ Latter Day Saints
_____ Jewish
_____ Muslim
_____ Other; please, specify ___________________
_____ I am not religious.
8. How often do you attend religious services?
_____ 1 or more times per week
_____ 1 to 3 times per month
_____ A few times per year
_____ Seldom to never
9. Which ideological perspective best represents your views:
_____ Conservative _____ Moderate _____ Liberal
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Table 1
Religious Fundamentalism and Prejudice: Correlations Found and Measures Used
Study

Type of prejudice and
correlation with religious
fundamentalism

Altemeyer, 2003
Canadian undergrads and
parents
Students

Parents

Altemeyer & Hunsberger,
1992
Canadian undergrads’ parents
Altemeyer & Hunsberger,
2004
Canadian undergrads and
parents
Students
Parents
Fulton et al., 1999
US undergrads

Measure of prejudice

Homosxl indv .61
Other religions .82

Attitudes Toward Homosexuals Scale*
Religious Ethnocentrism Scale*

Homosxl indv .52
Other religions .78

Attitudes Toward Homosexuals Scale*
Religious Ethnocentrism Scale*

Homosxl indv .41

Attitudes Toward Homosexuals Scale*

Homosxl indv .51

Attitudes Toward Homosexuals Scale*

Homosxl indv .57

Attitudes Toward Homosexuals Scale*

Homosxl indv overall .44
Morally justified .46
Not morally justified .37

Hunsberger, 1996
Canadian community sample

Homosxl indv

Hunsberger et al., 1999
Ghanaian undergrads
Canadian undergrads

Homosxl indv
Ghanaian Muslim .78
Ghanaian Christian .52
Canadian Christian .50
Women
Ghanaian Muslim .66
Ghanaian Christian .12†
Canadian Christian .39

18 items from the Attitudes Toward Lesbians and
Attitudes Toward Gay Men Scales with references
to gender removed
Attitudes Toward Homosexuals Scale*

Muslim .65
Hindu .52
Jew .42
Christian .42

Kirkpatrick. 1993
US and Canadian undergrads

Women .13
Homosxl indv .28

McFarland, 1989
US Christian undergrads

Women .43
Homosxl indv .40

* Measure used in the present study
† Non-significant

Attitudes Toward Homosexuals Scale*

Sexist Attitudes Toward Women Scale* with 10
outdated items removed

10 items from the Attitude Toward Women Scale
6 items from the Attitudes Toward Lesbians and
Attitudes Toward Gay Men Scales with references
to gender removed
10 items from the Attitude Toward Women Scale
6 items from the Attitudes Toward Lesbians and
Attitudes Toward Gay Men Scales with references
to gender removed
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Table 2
Participants by Gender and Race/ethnicity
Race/Ethnicity

Male

Female

African American

15

75

Caucasian

28

56

Multiracial

0

Asian

1 (Vietnamese)

9 (1 African American/Cherokee, 1 Hispanic/Filipino,
1 Caucasian/Pacific Islander, 1 African American/Korean,
1 African American/Blackfoot, 1 Caucasian/Hispanic,
1 Caucasian/African American, 1 Caucasian/Choctaw,
1 Caucasian/Hispanic/Cherokee)*
3 (2 Korean, 1 Asian other)

Hispanic

1

1

Native American

1 (Caskaskian)

0

Other

1

1

Total

47

145

* Race/ethnicities presented in the order listed on the Demographics questionnaire (Appendix B)
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Attitudes toward women at different levels of religious fundamentalism. When
religious fundamentalism is low (RF Group1), negative attitudes toward women are low.
At moderate (RF Group2) and high (RF Group4) levels of fundamentalism, negative
attitudes toward women are high.
Figure 2. Attitudes toward homosexual individuals at different levels of religious
fundamentalism. When religious fundamentalism is low (RF Group1), negative attitudes
toward homosexual individuals are low. As religious fundamentalism increases, negative
attitudes toward homosexual individuals also increase, with those high in religious
fundamentalism (RF Group4) demonstrating the most negative attitudes.
Figure 3. Attitudes toward other religions at different levels of religious fundamentalism.
When religious fundamentalism is low (RF Group1), negative attitudes toward other
religions are low. As religious fundamentalism increases, negative attitudes toward other
religions also increase, with those high in religious fundamentalism (RF Group4)
demonstrating the most negative attitudes.
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